As
our readers probably know, on October 16, 2013, a federal jury found Mark Cuban
not guilty on allegations of insider trading in violation of § 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and SEC
Rule 10b-5. Beyond the headlines, however, particular consideration
should be given to the jury charge in this case. An insider trading claim
is often amorphous and difficult to prove. See SEC v. Musella, 578
F. Supp. 425, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The claim requires, in part, proof
that the defendant received material, nonpublic information. Court
records from Cuban’s trial reveal that the jury struggled with the definition
of nonpublic and asked the judge if there was a level of detail necessary for
information to be considered public information. The judge referred the
jury back to the jury charge, which stressed that the key inquiry for whether
information is nonpublic is whether the information is “available.” The
charge described, among other details, that “the fact that information has not
appeared in a newspaper or other widely available public medium does not alone
determine whether the information is ‘nonpublic’.” and explained that
information made available to analysts, investors, and the press would be
public information. The full jury charge is available here. Ultimately, the jury found that the SEC did not prove by
preponderance of the evidence that Cuban received material, nonpublic
information. Accordingly, when litigating insider trading cases, the jury
charge in SEC v. Cuban may provide a useful example of court-approved
definitions and instructions for difficult and amorphous insider trading
concepts.
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