Showing posts with label Romine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Romine. Show all posts

NAVIGATING BETWEEN APPEAL AND MANDAMUS: THE PATH FROM AAA TO FINRA


Morford v. Esposito Securities, LLC
Dallas Court of Appeals, No. 05-14-01223-CV (September 18, 2015)
Justices Fillmore, Stoddart (Opinion), and Whitehill

Esposito, a licensed securities broker and member of FINRA, agreed to help Appellants find investors for their venture, Nemaha, in exchange for a percentage of the money received. The agreement contained a provision requiring any dispute to be resolved through AAA arbitration. After Appellants negotiated two transactions on their own, Esposito filed a claim for arbitration with the AAA, seeking a portion of the total consideration received by Nemaha. Appellants refused to participate in the AAA arbitration. So, Esposito filed suit, and a motion to compel arbitration before the AAA. In response, Appellants moved to compel arbitration before FINRA. The trial court determined that Appellants were not “customers” of Esposito, as required by FINRA, and granted Esposito’s motion to compel arbitration before the AAA. Appellants appealed, asking the Court to reverse the order compelling arbitration before the AAA and to compel arbitration before FINRA instead. In the alternative, Appellants asked the Court to treat their appeal from the order compelling AAA arbitration as a petition for writ of mandamus.

The Dallas Court of Appeals recognized it lacked jurisdiction to review the order compelling AAA arbitration, but concluded it could treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus, while simultaneously reviewing on interlocutory appeal the denial of Appellants’ motion for FINRA arbitration. The Court reasoned—and the parties apparently agreed—that, if Appellants were “customers” of Esposito, they have a contractual right to compel arbitration through FINRA as a third-party beneficiary of Esposito’s member agreement with FINRA. And if that right is erroneously denied by virtue of an order compelling AAA arbitration, Appellants would lack an adequate remedy at law. Thus, the Court concluded that it had mandamus jurisdiction to consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by compelling arbitration before the AAA rather than FINRA.

In addressing the dispositive issue on appeal—whether Esposito was a “customer” of Appellants under FINRA rules—the appellate court rejected the argument that Appellants could only be customers of Esposito if Esposito had actually received payment from Appellants. Instead the Court found the agreement between Appellants and Esposito represented an undertaking to purchase services from Esposito for a fee, which falls within the ordinary definition of “customer” for FINRA purposes. Because the parties agreed that, if Appellants were customers of Esposito under FINRA rules, arbitration before FINRA was proper (notwithstanding the Agreement requiring arbitration before AAA), the Court reversed the trial court’s order denying Appellants’ motion to compel arbitration before FINRA and ordered the parties to proceed to FINRA arbitration. It then conditionally granted the Appellants’ petition for writ of mandamus with respect to the trial court’s order compelling arbitration before the AAA.

INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS: COMPANY HAS AN ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE TO PROVIDE A REPORT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT IF DONE PRELIMINARY TO A PROPOSED JUDICIAL PROCEEDING

Shell learned it was under investigation by the Department of Justice for possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by one of Shell’s contractors. After meeting with the DOJ, Shell agreed to conduct an internal investigation and provide a confidential report to the DOJ. During their discussions, the DOJ identified a Shell employee, Robert Writt, as a possible witness or person of interest. Upon conclusion of its investigation, Shell provided the promised written report to the DOJ. The report stated (among other things) that Writt was aware of “several red flags” and provided inconsistent information. Shell then terminated Writt’s employment. Writt sued Shell, alleging Shell defamed him when it voluntarily provided a copy of the written report to the DOJ. Shell moved for summary judgment on the ground it was absolutely privileged to provide the report to the DOJ because it did so “preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding.” While that motion was pending, the DOJ filed a criminal action charging Shell with conspiracy to violate the FCPA; that action was concluded by a deferred prosecution agreement. The trial court granted Shell’s summary judgment motion, agreeing with Shell that its conduct was absolutely privileged. But the court of appeals reversed, holding that the report was only conditionally privileged.

The Texas Supreme Court held that Shell was entitled to the absolute privilege because Shell was the target of a DOJ investigation when it furnished the report, the information related to the DOJ’s inquiry, and the evidence conclusively established Shell provided the report with “serious contemplation” that it might be prosecuted by the DOJ. The Court emphasized the draconian penalties available under the FCPA, the rise in enforcement actions brought by the DOJ, and the fact that businesses that refused to cooperate with the DOJ were subjected to substantially greater penalties if the DOJ ultimately prevailed. The Court distinguished—but did not displace—its prior holding in Hurlbut v. Gulf Atlantic Life Insurance Co., where the Court concluded statements made to an Assistant Attorney General were only conditionally privileged because they were voluntarily made prior to a formal investigation of the company. Although the line between the absolute and conditional privilege is not always clear, the Court’s opinion provides guidance on the issue and an incentive for companies that are the target of an investigation to cooperate with law enforcement while minimizing the company’s exposure to a defamation suit.

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